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9-503 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOURAMENDMENT-Messenger V. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J.
Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (Ch. 1972).
REPOSSESSION UNDER SECTION

TEENTH

In the early evening of November 17, 1971, John Messenger discovered that his 1966 Chevrolet Impala was missing from the parking
area behind the apartment building in which he was a tenant. A telephone call to the Linden police disclosed that his car had not been
stolen, but instead had been repossessed by an agent who had acted for
the Peoples Trust Company after the bank had unsuccessfully attempted to contact Messenger by telephone and by ordinary mail to
demand possession of the car. Messenger's monthly installment payment due October 13th had been delinquent for over a month, and
although earlier that same day the bank had received the October
payment in the mail, the bank's collection department had not yet
become aware that the payment had arrived. Messenger had been more
than 10 days late in making 12 out of a total of 14 payments, and the
November payment, due on the 13th, was in arrears four days when
the bank instructed an agency to repossess the car.1
Messenger had purchased the car from Sandy Motors, a used car
dealer, on July 10, 1970. Immediately following the sale of the automobile, Sandy Motors assigned all of its rights in the agreement to the
Peoples Trust Company. The terms of the agreement, which were set
out in a standard form contract furnished by the Peoples Trust Company, provided that the "Seller retains a purchase money Security
Interest in the Vehicle and all accessions until Buyer fully performs
hereunder." 2 On the front of the agreement above the signatures, reference was made in relatively large capital letters to the terms printed
on back of the document, where, among a number of contract terms
in legible fine print, appeared the following:
In the event of default by Buyer hereunder, (1) the entire unpaid balance of the Total of Payments shall, at the option of
Holder, become immediately due and payable, and (2) Buyer, upon
1 Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 3-5, 295 A.2d 402, 403-04 (Ch.
1972). Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2 [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff].
2 121 N.J. Super. at 3, 295 A.2d at 403. See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note l,"Exhibit
B." Messenger had purchased the car for a cash price of $1,674.75, with a cash down
payment of $674.75, and had agreed to pay the balance of $1,000 plus interest and
insurance charges in 24 equal monthly installments of $52.01 each. The deferred price
totaled $1,922.99.
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demand, shall deliver the vehicle to Holder, or Holder may, with
or without legal process and with or without previous notice or
demand for performance, enter any premises wherein the vehicle
may be and take possession of the same, together with anything in
8
the vehicle.
The day after his car was repossessed, Messenger contacted the
bank and stated that he would be able to make the November installment on the next day. He was informed that the full contract price,
including time payment, was now due and owing, and that failure to
meet the accelerated payments would result in sale of the car within 10
days of the date of repossession. On November 22, Messenger received
notice by means of a certified letter from Peoples Trust that his car
was to be sold by public auction at Sandy Motors at 9:30 A.M. on
4
November 24, 1971.
On November 23, Messenger brought an action against Sandy
Motors and Peoples Trust in superior court, chancery division, seeking
an interlocutory injunction against the sale. The court on the same day
issued an order to show cause containing a preliminary restraint. A
negotiated arrangement between the parties followed, through which
Messenger regained possession of the car and his account was once
again reinstated at the bank.
Messenger, in support of his demand for injunctive and declaratory relief, argued that the self-help provisions of section 9-503 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-503) were unconstitutional. Messenger's contentions presented two primary issues
for the court's consideration. The first was whether there was a sufficient element of state action in self-help repossession to invoke the
procedural due process safeguards of the fourteenth amendment.
Secondly assuming the requisite state action, did the creditor's exercise of self-help repossession constitute such a deprivation of a debtor's
property interest so as to be violative of due process because of failure
to provide for prior notice and hearing?6
The Messenger court held that the existence of section 9-503 of
the Code did not make a creditor's exercise of self-help repossession
121 N.J. Super. at 3, 295 A.2d at 403 (emphasis added).
Id. at 5, 295 A.2d at 404; Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 1, at 2-3.
5 UCC § 9-503 (West 1972) provides in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-503 (1962) adopts verbatim the official text.
6 121 N.J. Super. at 6, 295 A.2d at 404.
8
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of debtor's automobile an action under color of state law within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment. It rejected as "misplaced" reliance upon the extension of the state action concept which has recently
developed in the civil rights context. 7 Instead, the court found the
right to self-help repossession to be a remedy secured under the terms
of private contractual agreement, the legality of which had been recog8
nized at common law long before its adoption by the Code.
In the alternative, on the assumption that the fourteenth amendment was applicable to the case, the court held that the defendant's
exercise of self-help repossession was not violative of due process. 9 The
court considered significant the economic consequences of a requirement for prior notice and hearing and, as a second factor, found
nothing in the self-help remedy which pointed to the use of unfair
tactics. 10 In considering recent decisions, the court noted that the cases
still permit a measure of flexibility in fashioning due process requirements."' While the agreement signed by Messenger was found to be a
contract of adhesion, a buyer in the world of automobile financing "having a wealth of experience all around him to draw upon and make him
aware of the possibility of repossession," could waive his right to procedural safeguards, and could not properly claim his right to due process was violated simply because no prior hearing took place. 12
The question of whether the requirements of due process invalidate the self-help remedy of section 9-503 of the Code has been termed
by one commentator as "the most important of all the constitutional attacks on prejudgment seizures for banks and finance companies with
large portfolios of consumer paper." 13 The ground work for attack was
laid in 1969 with the Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.,14 where the Court held that the Wisconsin procedure
which authorized prejudgment garnishment of an individual's wages in
the absence of notice and prior hearing constituted a deprivation of
the debtor's property in violation of procedural due process.' 5 The
Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the taking
acted only to temporarily freeze the debtor's wages pending a hearing
7 Id. at 7, 295 A.2d at 405.

8 Id. at 8-9, 295 A.2d at 405-06.
9 Id. at 17, 295 A.2d at 410.
10 Id. at 9-12, 295 A.2d at 406-08.
11 Id. at 13, 295 A.2d at 408.
12 Id. at 16, 295 A.2d at 410.
18 Felsenfeld & Finkelson, Consumer Protection Influences on Article 9, 5 UCC L.J.
5, 40 (1972).
14 395 US. 837 (1969).
15 Id. at 342.
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on the merits. The Court, however, indicated that such a summary procedure may "well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations," but only in actions initiated to benefit the general
public and involving a significant state interest. 16 In Sniadach, it could
find before it no such special situation nor was the Wisconsin statute
drawn narrowly enough to meet such an unusual condition if there
were one.

17

The Court recognized that wages were "a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system."' 8 The result of a prejudgment garnishment "as a practical matter [was to] drive
a wage earning family to the wall,"' 19 so that the taking of property in
the absence of notice and a prior hearing violated due process.20
The Court rejected the contention that deference be given to the
time-hallowed remedy of prejudgment attachment.
The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime
does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its
21
modern forms.

Sniadach left open significant questions relating to the repossession
process under Article 9. Were other forms of property, including consumer goods, to be covered by the rationale of this decision? What was
the specific nature of a prior hearing which would comport with due
process? Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion in Sniadach, sought to
establish the minimum standards required for procedural due process,
concluding that due process requirements of notice and hearing must
be
aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity,
16 Id. at 339. See Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. Rxv. 942, 947-49
(1970). The Sniadach Court found extraordinary situations which justified summary
procedures in the following cases: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 US. 594,
598-600 (1950) (sustaining summary seizures by the Federal Food and Drug Administration
of misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947) (sustained authority
of conservator appointed by Federal Home Loan Bank Commission to summarily seize
the assets of a savings and loan association); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31
(1928) (upheld state statute authorizing superintendent of banks to attach the property of
stockholder of defunct bank against whom stock assessment had been levied); Ownbey
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-12 (1921) (upheld prejudgment attachment of a nonresident's
property in order to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction for state court). The citation of
these cases would appear to indicate the limitation of summary seizure procedures to
circumstances involving a significant state interest initiated to benefit the general public
17 395 U.S. at 339.
1s Id. at 340.
19 Id. at 341-42.
20 Id. at 342.
21 Id. at 340.
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of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor22before he can
be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use.
The Sniadach decision opened the doors of justice to a broad headon attack of prejudgment seizure remedies. One writer commented that
Sniadach represented merely the "tip of the iceberg" which could ultimately strike at the creditor's entire arsenal of weapons in the Code. 2
The great weight of both state and federal authority adopted this broad
approach, and read Sniadach as an attack on the entire domain of pre24
judgment remedies.
In June, 1972, the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin 25 decisively
limited the powers of creditors to affect prejudgment repossession
through the process of statutory replevin. Both Florida and Pennsylvania had statutes authorizing state officers, upon the ex parte application of a creditor, to summarily seize a debtor's personal property.
22 Id. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23 Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REv. 302, 323 (1972).
24 Since Sniadach, summary prejudgment seizures have come under constitutional
challenges throughout the country. The following cases have struck down such seizures as
violative of procedural due process because of failure to provide for prior notice and
hearing: Hall v. Carson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (distraint of furniture without hearing in the enforcement of a landlord's lien); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) (distress sale of tenants' household goods by landlord under Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y.
1970) (prejudgment statutory replevin); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(innkeeper's lien statute); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1971) (prejudgment attachment of bank account authorized by statute); Blair v.
Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) (California's Claim and
Delivery Law providing for prejudgment replevin); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Servs.,
Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970) (prejudgment garnishment of accounts receivable); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment of commercial bank account).
A number of cases adopted a strict interpretation of Sniadach in upholding summary
prejudgment remedies. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir.
1970); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); American
Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Young v. Ridley,
309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463
P.2d 68 (1969); Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (App. Div. 1969).
25 407 U.S. 67 (1972), rev'g Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971) and
Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970). For an overall view of Fuentes, see,
e.g., Budnitz, Due Process in Consumer Cases: Fuentes v. Shevin, 6 CLEARINCHOUSE Rzv.
418 (1972); Gardner, Fuentes v. Shevin: The New York Creditor and Replevin, 22 BuFFALO
L. REv. 17 (1972); Note, Right to Hearing Before Taking of Property, 86 HARv. L. REV. 85
(1972); Note, Creditor's Rights, Fuentes v. Shevin, 3 LOYOLA U. CHi. L.J. 451 (1972); Note,
Debtor-CreditorRelations-Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process for Debtors, 51 N.C.L. REv. 111
(1972); Note, Fuentes v. Shevin: An End to the Misuse of Replevin, 34 U. Pirr. L. REv. 312
(1972); Note, Replevin-Prior Notice and Hearing-Due Process, 40 TENN. L. REv. 125
(1972).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:629

Neither statute provided for prior notice to the debtor nor an opportunity to challenge the seizure at any kind of prior hearing. The Court
held that such summary prejudgment procedures constituted a taking
of property without due process of law. 26 The Court found that pre-

judgment replevin statutes bore little resemblance to the ancient common law replevin action, which was a remedy to seize goods wrongfully
taken, not a remedy for use by creditors to seize goods alleged to be
27
wrongfully detained.
The Fuentes Court recognized that the central meaning of procedural due process is the requirement that parties whose rights are to
be affected must have a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
at a "meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 28 The issue for
the Court was
whether procedural due process in the context of these cases requires an opportunity for a hearing before the State authorizes its
agents to seize property in the possession of a person upon the application of another.29
The Court concluded that the right to notice and hearing must be
granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. While
at a later hearing damages may be awarded to an individual for a
wrongful deprivation and the goods returned, no "award can undo the
fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural
due process has already occurred." 80 Moreover, the fourteenth amendment's protection against deprivation of property acts to safeguard not
only the rights of undisputed ownership but also extends protection to
any significant property interest-in Fuentes, the debtors' interest in
the continued possession and use of the property held as collateral.3 1
These safeguards attach whenever a significant property interest is at
8
stake, no matter what the ultimate outcome of a hearing on the merits.

2

"[S]ome form of notice and hearing-formal or informal" is required
26 407 Us. at 96.
27 Id. at 79. At common law a creditor who wished to invoke the state's power to
recover goods wrongfully detained had to proceed through the action of debt or detinue,
and could not seize the debtor's property before final judgment. When the common law
did permit the prejudgment seizure of property by an official it provided some type of
notice and opportunity to be heard, and the state official made a summary determination
of the relative rights of the parties before seizing property. Id.
28 Id. at 80 (quoting from Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 US. 545, 552 (1965)).
29 407 U.S. at 80.
30 Id. at 82.
31 Id. at 86.
32 Id. at 87.
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before the deprivation of any property interest that cannot be characterized as de minimus.s3
It is significant that the Fuentes Court went on to hold that due
process safeguards are not limited to the protection of only a few types
of specialized property interests, since the fourteenth amendment speaks
of "property" generally:
It is not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to
make its own critical evaluation of those choices3 4 and protect only
the ones that, by its own lights, are "necessary."
The Court rejected the view that consideration of the costs in time,
effort, and expense imposed by the requirements of a prior hearing
could outweigh a constitutional right, for "the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency." 3 5 It reasoned that the requirements of procedural due process are "not intended to promote efficiency
or accommodate all possible interests," but rather "to protect the par'3 6
ticular interests of a person whose possessions are about to be taken.
The Fuentes Court also rejected the view that default by a debtor
could be considered an "extraordinary situation" that could justify
postponing notice and opportunity to be heard. Expanding on the
Sniadach interpretation, the Court concluded that outright seizure was
permitted in only a few limited situations of truly unusual nature, such
as those serving an important governmental or general public interest.3 The Court was unable to find such an interest in a summary seizure where no more than the creditor's private gain was directly at stake.
By way of dictum, the Court observed that there might be "special
situations" demanding prompt action which would justify summary seizure of collateral. Such situations might exist where a creditor could
make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods. However, it would require, in such a situation as it
had in Sniadach, that the statutes be" 'narrowly drawn to meet any such
unusual condition' "38 Here no such unusual situation was presented by
the facts of the case.
Finally, the Court considered the important issue of waiver. The
creditors in Fuentes argued that the debtors had waived their basic
Id. at 90 n.21.
Id. at 90.
35 Id. at 90 n.22.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 90-92. See, e.g., cases cited note 16 supra.
38 407 U.S. at 93 (quoting from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339
(1970)).
33

34
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procedural due process rights by signing conditional sales contracts
which provided that the seller had the right to retake or repossess merchandise upon default.8 9 These terms, part of standard form printed
contracts, appeared in fine print without any explanation to clarify their
meaning. The Court made reference to its recent decision in D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,40 where it had outlined the considerations
relevant to the determination of contractual waiver of due process
rights. In Overmyer, the contract was negotiated between two corporations and the waiver provisions included were specifically bargained
for and drafted by their attorneys during negotiations. The Overmyer
Court noted that since the waiver provision was "not a case of unequal
bargaining power or overreaching," and the agreement "from the start,
was not a contract of adhesion," the contractual waiver of due process
had been "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly" made. 41
The Fuentes Court found no difficulty in distinguishing the Overmyer agreement from the cases before it. In Fuentes, there was no bargaining over terms, since the purported waiver clause was a printed
part of the form contract on which the sale was conditioned. The
parties were far from equal in bargaining power and there was no showiiig that the buyers were aware of the significance of the fine print
which purported to waive their constitutional rights.4 2 The Court
noted that Overmyer had recognized that " 'where the contract is one of
adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and
where the debtor receives nothing for the [waiver] provision, other
legal consequences may ensue.' "43 At the very least, the Fuentes Court
concluded that a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must be
clear. 44 However, the Court was able to avoid exploring the consequences of the Overmyer view by holding that the language of the purported waiver provisions were insufficient on their face to effectively
waive appellants' constitutional right to a pre-seizure hearing.45
The Fuentes decision may be interpreted as an emphatic recognition of the constitutional right to notice and a hearing prior to the deprivation of a property interest. 46 However, the Fuentes Court failed
89 407 U.S. at 94.
40
41
42

405 U.S. 174 (1972).
Id. at 186-87.
407 U.S. at 95.

Id. (quoting from D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972)).
407 U.S. at 95.
45 Id. at 95-96.
46 The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 89 (1972). For a general discussion of summary remedies, see Note, The Prior Hearing Rule and the Demise of Ex
Parte Remedies, 53 B.U.L. REV. 41 (1973).
43

44

NOTES
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to go beyond Sniadach in articulating a set of minimum safeguards to be
observed at such a hearing, leaving the nature and form of these hearings to variation which it considered to be properly the subject of legislative reform. 47 The Court concluded by quoting from Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Sniadach that such a hearing would require
" 'establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of
his property ...."-48
Commentary in a leading guide for practitioners has indicated the
belief that Fuentes "casts a serious doubt on the constitutionality of the
provision of the Code authorizing repossession without judicial action." 49
If a creditor's use of judicial seizure is condemned as it has been
because there is no notice to the debtor nor opportunity for him to
be heard as to the existence of a default justifying respossession,
there is an inconsistency in permitting the creditor to bypass that
protective rule hands [sic] and repossessing without judicial aid.50
Unquestionably, the Fuentes opinion raises valid questions as to the
constitutionality of the Code's provision for self-help repossession. However, it is argued that the opinion ignored the special nature and interests involved in secured transactions-the right to look to the collatteral upon default is the very basis upon which a secured party enters
into the transaction. 5 ' Moreover, it is still open to question whether the
Code's provision for self-help repossession necessarily involves state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Is there an element of state action in self-help sufficient even to invoke fourteenth
amendment protection? And if so, what are the parameters of due process in the world of secured transactions?
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code unified the law of secured transactions, treating various forms of financing devices as merely
different methods of creating security interests. At the heart of Article
9 is Part 5, which sets out the rights and remedies of the parties when
a secured transaction breaks down. The secured party's right to repos47
48
49

407 U.S. at 96-97.
Id. at 97 (quoting from 395 U.S. at 343).
4 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503:5.1 (Supp. 1972-73).

50 Id.

51 Note, Article 9-Notice Provisions Upon Default, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 535, 538-39.
It should be noted that the Fuentes decision was decided by a 4-3 vote in which
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, both known for their philosophy of judicial restraint,
did not participate.
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sess collateral in which he holds a security interest is of critical importance and is central to the enforcement machinery of Article 9.52
Until Fuentes, a creditor was able to effect repossession through
statutory replevin without prior hearing and notice. With the constitutionally mandated modification of that remedy, self-help repossession
becomes the critical remedy. 53 Given the large number of self-help repossessions across the nation, creditors contend that any requirement
for a prior hearing will result in higher costs of doing business which
will be reflected in increased costs for the consumer, that credit-worthy
customers will be denied credit, and that the courts will be jammed
with unnecessary legal actions. 5 4 Spokesmen for the Code as well as
academic writers foresee major economic dislocations to the credit com55
munity resulting from any further extension of due process safeguards.
Supporters of self-help argue that it is both an economical and necessary remedy.
52 UCC § 9-501, Comment 1, states in part: "The rights of the secured party in the
collateral after the debtor's default are of the essence of a security transaction."
53 The economic dimensions of the issue become readily apparent by way of reference
to the following statistics cited in the Messenger decision. Banks, finance companies,
credit unions, and other lending institutions had extended ;538.8 billion in consumer credit
throughout the United States to finance the purchase of automobiles up to the end of the
first quarter of 1972. Ford Motor Credit Company alone had 977,000 accounts nationally including 21,400 in New Jersey, the total value of the New Jersey accounts running a little
over $40 million. During the same period the total number of repossessions by Ford Credit
nationally was 38,142; in New Jersey a total of 465. While the figures representing the
ratio of repossession cases to all accounts is relatively low (approximately 4% nationally),
the number of cars repossessed in a year is large. The New Jersey Division of Motor
Vehicles reported 14,192 notices of seizure in 1970, and 13,489 in 1971. In California
statistics indicate the eight major banks and finance companies reported 49,600 automobile
repossessions in that state during 1971. 121 N.J. Super. at 10-11, 295 A.2d at 406-07.
The importance of self-help repossession is further appreciated by 1970 figures from
the General Motors Acceptance Corporation. During that year they reported approximately
144,000 repossessions in the United States, while during the same period they replevied
only about 2,000 automobiles. Felsenfeld & Finkelson, supra note 13, at 40 n.130.
Total consumer installment credit currently outstanding in the United States exceeds
$127 billion. 59 FED. REs. BULL. A 56 (1973). Statistics indicate that the growth of consumer
indebtedness is a relatively recent development: (figures in billions) 1929-$3.2, 1939-$4.5,
1950-$14.7, 1959-$39.2, 1962-$48.2. McCracken, Mao & Fricke, Consumer Installment Credit
Public Policy, 17 MICH. Bus. STUDS. 1, 7 (1965) (figures compiled from FED. RES. BULL.).
54 See, e.g., Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint,
68 COLUM. L. Rrv. 445, 478-86 (1968). See also Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J.
Super. 1, 12, 295 A.2d 402, 407-08 (Ch. 1972); Brief for UCC as Amicus Curiae at 27-28,
Adams v. Southern Calif. First Nat'l Bank, No. 72-1484 (9th Cir., filed Mar. 15, 1972);
Felsenfeld & Finkelson, supra note 13, at 5.
55 See, e.g.,

J. WHrE & R.

SUMMERS,
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974-75 (1972).
It is contended that non-judicial repossession, not involving costly legal fees, is far
more economical than formal legal process. Self-help is justified as being essential to the
COMMERCIAL CODE
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Critics of this view, on the other hand, point to the large number
of voluntary "turn-ins" made by buyers who are in default, in which
case prior hearings are unnecessary. 56 Based on experience in small
claims and landlord tenant courts, they contend that an administratively streamlined procedure sufficient to meet constitutionally required
standards of due process may be had at a cost far less than that estimated by the credit community. 57 For, if there is rarely merit in debtors'
claims, most cases will go by default and calendar congestion will not
develop. 5 Moreover, consumer advocates have attacked the Code as
ant;_-consumer legislation cloaked in a "mirage of neutrality." 59 They
point out that protective provisions relating to consumer goods financing were deleted from the 1949 draft under lobby pressures which
termed the effort "social legislation." 60
protection of creditor's collateral since personal property, and automobiles in particular,
may be damaged or concealed before a creditor is able to obtain relief from the courts.
Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transactions, 8 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 535, 537 (1967). Spokesmen for the credit community have estimated
a per unit cost of $500 for repossession by judicial process. Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 47, Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402
(Ch. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Law]. In measuring the accuracy of these figures the "cry of wolf" has been sounded, id. at 29, and
such estimates have been attacked as an example of the creation of a credibility gap.
Felsenfeld & Finkelson, supra note 13, at 41 (citing Johnson, "Creditors' Remedies," INDUS.
BANKER (Jan. 1971)).
56 Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Law, supra note 55, at 44-46.
57 Id. at 53-55.
58 Felsenfeld & Finkelson, supra note 13, at 49.
Consumer advocates argue that the abuse of the self-help remedy has often produced
considerable hardship for the debtor. Investigation of low-income consumer groups have
uncovered numerous cases of excesses and abuses perpetrated by repossessors while attempting to reclaim collateral. See Comment, Non-Judicial Repossession-Reprisal in
Need of Reform, 11 B.C. IND. & CoM. L REv. 435 (1970). A recent study of automobile
repossession in Connecticut disclosed that the same autos are often repossessed and resold
several times at high profits over a relatively short period of time; that sales are made to
poor credit risks in anticipation of quick default and profitable resale. Shuchman, Profit
on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV.
20, 42 (1969). Counsel for consumers argue that the only sure method of guarding against
such abuses is to give every debtor his day in court, and that the state is responsible for
establishing an efficient system to provide it. Felsenfeld & Finkelson, supra note 13, at 48-49.
A recent study of consumer defaults indicates that about a third claim some reason
for ceasing payments which typically implicate the seller-principally fraud or misrepresentations concerning the goods. See 1 D. CAPLoVrrz, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 4-12 (1971).
While not all of these complaints are legitimate, according to one writer it "seems likely
that there is a significant percentage of cases where the debtor has a good defense and
the creditor has no legal right to repossess." Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due
Process for the Consumer; What's Due for the Creditor, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 7, 15
(1972).
59 Clark, supra note 23, at 306.
60 Id. (citing 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.2 (1965)).
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Given the imposing economic considerations of the repossession
issue, the competing and contradictory debtor-creditor interests, and
the conflicting rights and equities involved, few courts faced with the
recently mounted constitutional attack on self-help repossession have
evinced a desire to come to grips with the demands of due process in
the context of this remedy as codified by section 9-503. In the emerging
body of case law that has developed since the first decision in 1971, the
validity of the remedy has more often turned on the presence or absence of state action sufficient to invoke the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment. Decisions are in conflict and, as the Messenger
court recognized, the questions presented "are before long going to be
' 61
placed before the United States Supreme Court.
McCormick v. First National Bank 62 was the first reported case
challenging the constitutionality of section 9-503 of the Code. McCormick had purchased a car from an auto dealer and had financed the
purchase with a security agreement which the dealer assigned to the
defendant bank. The bank's agent repossessed the car without prior
notice after McCormick allegedly defaulted in his payments.
McCormick sought to invoke federal jurisdiction on the grounds
that the bank's repossession of his automobile without prior opportunity to be heard deprived him of his property without due process, and
According to Clark, the Code's drafters believed that the omission of the safeguards
would do no harm since the "regulatory" aspects of secured consumer transactions were to
be covered by specific state legislation, while Article 9 would cover only the "perfection"
requirements. The states, however, failed to enact the type of consumer protection
statutes envisioned by the Code, with the result that "Article 9 is the governing law when
it comes to default, foreclosure, and deficiency in consumer credit transactions." In this
manner, the Part 5 enforcement machinery of Article 9 which was drafted in contemplation of commercial transactions between businessmen "unknowingly has caught consumer
credit transactions in its grasp as well." Id. at 306, 308.
Spokesmen for the Code have argued that a buyer who has been the victim of a
wrongful repossession has legal remedies in the form of injunctive relief as well as other
safeguards built into the Code. See, e.g., Brief for UCC as Amicus Curiae at 26, Adams
v. Southern Calif. First Nat'l Bank, No. 72-1484 (9th Cir., filed Mar. 15, 1972). However, it is argued that since most repossessions involve low-income buyers who generally
lack the sophistication to recognize actionable abuses, few actually seek legal redress. While
an evaluation of debtor remedies discloses several avenues of possible redress, it has been
recognized that the "legal remedies and practical realities do not coincide." Comment,
supra note 58, at 457. It has been suggested by Code spokesmen that the existence of legal
services in poverty areas makes legal redress a real and not a theoretical right. However, as
has been pointed out, this thinking
proceed[s] upon the assumption that the typical dispossessed debtor is readily
disposed to the protection of his rights through affirmative legal action. Such a
presupposition is distinctly middle-class and, perhaps, inordinately naive.
Id. at 458.
01 121 N.J. Super. at 5, 295 A.2d at 404.
62 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
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that this action was under color of state law. The court dismissed McCormick's complaint pursuant to defendant's motion, finding no federal subject matter jurisdiction. The court rejected plaintiff's claim of
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) on two
grounds, holding that these statutes applied only in cases involving infringements of personal liberty, not to deprivations of personal property rights. 63 The court relied in part on a three-judge decision in
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.64 The Supreme Court has recently
reversed this decision, holding that under section 1343(3) it is not permissible to distinguish between personal and property rights.65
The court further held that McCormick's auto was not repossessed
under color of law, thus rejecting plaintiff's contention that the bank
had acted under section 9-503 of the Code. While the security agreement gave the creditor all rights under the Code upon default of the
buyer, the court concluded that the Code provisions were included in
the contract simply by way of reference. Here the court found that the
bank, in acting independently, had exercised a private contractual
right and therefore its actions were not under color of state law. 66
The court, by way of dictum, also found no merit in plaintiff's
contention that section 9-503 was violative of due process under Sniadach.67 In that decision, a specialized property interest in the nature of
a necessity of life was involved, the deprivation of which, without a
63 Id. at 605-06. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a civil cause of action for a deprivation of constitutional rights,
and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) gives the federal courts jurisdiction to hear suits based on the
first statute. The "under color of" state law requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
"state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment have been construed to be of
the same breadth and scope. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
64 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970).
65 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
66 322 F. Supp. at 606.
67 Id. at 607.
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prior hearing, had resulted in economic hardship. The judge in McCormick found dispositive his own opinion in the three-judge Fuentes
decision, 68 later to be reversed by the Supreme Court, which rejected
the "necessities of life" property interest that some courts had read into
the Sniadach decision.6 9
With the exception of the McCormick interpretation of state action, the precedential value of the decision is of limited moment. However, as one writer has noted, "the case is unwittingly significant because of its finding that no real distinction exists between replevin and
repossession under § 9-503. '' 70 If this is the case, then the Fuentes requirement for prior notice and hearing before replevin would appear
to be equally applicable to the self-help remedy if the requisite element
of state action can be found in the latter procedure.
71
The most significant decision to date has been Adams v. Egley,
decided by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California. The plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment involved the constitutionality of sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the Code,
which provide for the creditor's right to repossess and dispose of collateral upon default by the debtor.7 2 Plaintiff Adams had borrowed $1,000
from the Bank of La Jolla, executing a promissory note and a security
agreement in favor of the bank. Shortly thereafter, the defendant
Southern California First National Bank became the successor in interest to the Bank of La Jolla. Adams fell behind on his payments and
defendant Egley, acting for the successor bank, repossessed two of the
three vehicles which served as collateral under the security agreement
73
and sold them later at a private sale.

Plaintiffs asserted two bases for the founding of federal jurisdiction, both of which the court recognized as involving a showing of
"some significant state involvement in the alleged wrongful acts ....- 74
68 Id.

69 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-90 (1972).
70 Clark, supra note 23, at 330.
71 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed sub nom. Adams v. Southern
California First Nat'l Bank, No. 72-1484 (9th Cir., filed Mar. 15, 1972). At the time of
this writing the Adams case has been argued before the court of appeals and a decision
is pending. For commentary on the case, see Note, Constitutionality of Sections 9-503, 9504-Due Process, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1503 (1972); Note, Hearing and Notice Required Prior to Repossession of Chattels under California Commercial Code Sections 9-503
and 9-504, 5 CREIGHTON L. REV. 360 (1972); Comment, Automobile Repossession: Law in
Flux, 2 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 43 (1973).
72 338 F. Supp. at 615-16. The other case represented in this consolidated decision is
Posadas v. Star & Crescent Fed. Credit Union, Civ. No. 70-359-N.
73 338 F. Supp. at 616.
74 Id. at 617. Jurisdiction predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). For text of statutes, see note 63 supra.
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For a finding of such jurisdiction, the court reasoned, the wrongful conduct of private individuals must be either authorized, sanctioned, or
75
encouraged by state law.
The bank contended that self-help repossession involved the selfexecuting terms of a private contract where there was no state involvement on which to found jurisdiction. The Adams court rejected this
contention, finding applicable the expanded concept of state action as
articulated by Reitman v. Mulkey. 76 In Reitman, an amendment to the
California constitution prohibiting restrictions on an individual's right
to sell to the party of his choice was held violative of the fourteenth
amendment. The California amendment acted to repeal various antidiscriminatory housing legislation and, in effect, served as state encouragement of private acts of discrimination. As interpreted by the Adams
court, Reitman found in the "mere enactment of the statute state involvement sufficient to bring the alleged discriminatory acts within the
7
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment."
While the Adams creditors contended that the repossessions were
private contractual acts, the court concluded that it could not be seriously doubted that the statutory enactment of the Code had a significant impact on the specific provisions of the contract. The reference to
the Code in Adams' contract, and "to immediate possession ... according to law" in Posadas' contract, indicated that creditors were "persuaded or induced to include" provisions for repossession since such a
remedy was permitted by the Code. The terms in the security agreements had therefore incorporated the Code's embodiment of state policy. Even if an independent right to repossess had been created by the
security agreement, that right was still created under authority of state
law. The court concluded that the acts of repossession had been made
"under color of state law," and that the passage of those Code sections
which authorized the acts constituted sufficient state action to raise a
78
federal question.
The Adams court then turned to the constitutional issue: whether
self-help repossession represented a deprivation of property in contravention of the due process clause. The court reviewed the attack on
statutory prejudgment remedies led by Sniadach and its progeny, and
rejected the narrow interpretation some courts had given to that
decision. 79 The Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes, coming a few
75 338 F. Supp. at 617.
76 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
77 338 F. Supp. at 617 (emphasis added).
78 Id. at 617-18.
79 Id. at 618-19. See Note, A Travesty of Justice: The Uniform and California Commercial Code § 9504(3), 4 Sw. U.L. REV. 330, 335-36 (1972).
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months after Adams, made it clear that even though a statute might be
drawn narrowly enough to comport with due process, it must also be
designed to protect a strong governmental or public interest which does
not ordinarily include the protection of a creditor's interest in collateral held by a debtor. 80 Since Adams was decided before this clarification of the "special situation" exception to Sniadach, the bank contended that since sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the Code involved only
secured transactions between contracting parties, they were drawn narrowly enough to constitute a special situation in which prejudgment
seizure was constitutionally valid.8 '
The Adams court rejected this premise on two grounds. First, the
mere entry into a security agreement is not sufficient to charge a party
to a contract with notice of waiver of his right to prior notice and hearing, even though the contract provides for repossession. Recognizing
the presumption against waiver of constitutional rights, the court held
that such waiver was ineffective where a standard form contract was involved. While a purported waiver might be effective where two commercially equal parties bargained at arms' length, this is clearly not the
situation in contracts of adhesion, where the terms are dictated by seller
or lender. Since section 9-503 was not limited to repossession between
parties of equal bargaining power, the statute failed to meet the test of
82
narrowness established by Sniadach.
Secondly, the court noted that sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the Code
were not confined to secured transactions of a nonessential nature.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes, the Sniadach case had
been interpreted as protecting only "specialized types of property" usually defined as necessities or essentials of life. Since the subjects of secured transactions are commonly household appliances, furniture, and
automobiles, all of which may be considered necessities, the Code, in
permitting repossession of this type of property, once again failed to
meet the narrowness requirement of Sniadach. Based upon this preFuentes interpretation of Sniadach, the Adams court found sections
9-503 and 9-504 of the Code violated due process since they permitted
summary repossession and resale of debtors' property. The repossessions were therefore unlawful, and plaintiffs were granted partial sum8
mary judgment.
Just two weeks after the Adams decision, the United States Dis80 407 U.S. at 91-93.
81 338 F. Supp. at 619.
82 Id. at 620.
83 Id. at 621-22.
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trict Court for the Northern District of California, in Oiler v. Bank of
America,84 came to the opposite conclusion on the same questions.
While the court agreed that direct action by a state official is not always
necessary to meet the requirement of state action, it found exceptions
only in situations where a state official has acted in concert with a pri-

vate individual, or where the power exercised is purely of a statutory
nature as distinguished from common law or contractual origin. In
other words, since the authority to repossess was based on a contractual
right that had received judicial approval long before the adoption of
the Code,85 the action by the bank was a private act taken to protect a
security interest pursuant to contract. Citing McCormick, the court refused to view such a transaction as state action. Rather, the Oler court,
rejecting Adams, would limit the Reitman extension of the state action
concept to situations involving racial injustice. Finding state action
lacking, the court granted the bank's motion to dismiss the action for
lack of jurisdiction. 86
To date there have been several post-Fuentes decisions attacking
the constitutionality of self-help repossession under section 9-503.17 Just
84 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See Burke, Conflicting Views on Self Help Provisions of Uniform Commercial Code Expressed by Federal District Courts in California,
26 PER. FIN. L.Q. RaP. 33 (1972).
In Oller the defendant bank repossessed an automobile pursuant to a conditional
sales contract. The plaintiff in Oiler, like Adams, predicated jurisdiction on 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), both of which require a showing that the challenged action in
question was conducted under color of state law.
Oller, requesting declaratory relief, contended that the bank's repossession under
authority of the Code constituted an action under color of law and that such action
deprived her of property without the constitutional safeguards of prior notice and
hearing as required by Sniadach. The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, finding no state action in the bank's repossession. 342 F. Supp. at 22-23.
85 Id. at 22.
86 Id. at 23. The conflicting decisions in Adams and Oller are reported to have
"created grave uncertainty and confusion among creditors in California as to the continued effectiveness" of self-help. Many creditors are said to have completely suspended
all repossession activities pending a higher court ruling. Others are reported to have
discontinued repossessions only in the southern district of California. See Burke, supra
note 84, at 37. But see Note, Summary Creditor Remedies: Going . . . Going . . . Gone?,
10 SAN DiEco L. REv. 292, 322 (1973). According to the writer, the confusion which has
developed after the Oiler decision has permitted most creditors to abandon the curbs on
their repossession procedures which were instituted after Adams.
The Adams decision has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Arguments have been
heard, and a decision is pending at the time this note is being written. See note 71 supra.
87 In Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972), a court dismissed
plaintiff's constitutional attack on § 9-503 for want of jurisdiction. The court concluded
that Reitman did not direct a holding that the "individual action" involved in self-help
repossession was state action. Instead, the court took the position that the extension of
state action was properly limited to the unique considerations of racial discrimination. Id.
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two weeks prior to Messenger, the United States District Court for the

Western District of Virginia decided such an action in Greene v. First
National Exchange Bank.88 Plaintiff Greene had purchased a car on an
installment contract. Upon default, agents of the bank to whom the
note and contract had been assigned repossessed his car. Greene contended that the authorization given by the Code to this practice deprived him of his property without due process of law. Plaintiff argued
that the Fuentes rationale extended to prohibit all state laws which provide for prejudgment seizure without a hearing, and that since section
9-503 permits such a seizure, the state had in effect deprived him of his
property without due process of law.8 9
The Greene court found the fourteenth amendment applicable
only to direct state action where state officials themselves seize the property, as in Fuentes, and distinguished such action from what it termed
"indirect state action" where private persons seized property under authority of a state law. 90 Reviewing Supreme Court decisions in which
prejudgment seizures of property without prior notice or hearing had
been held violative of due process, the Greene court concluded that
the essential element in each case had been the direct action by the
state through an official, agency or branch against an individual's property. 91 Here, the operation of the self-help remedy, while admittedly
at 121. The court recognized that its decision was "in conflict with the holding . . . of
Adams v. Egley and Posadas v. Star and Crescent Federal Credit Union ....
It is enough
to say that I disagree with the result in those cases." Id. (citation omitted).
There are several other unreported or pending cases. See, e.g., Zacharias v. Western
Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank, CCH 1972 Pov. L. REP.
16,352 (W.D. Pa., Aug. 29, 1972) (temporary restraining order prohibiting repossession and sale of auto under §§ 9-503 and 9504, creditor ordered to return car to debtor, debtor required to post bond); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., CCH 1972 Pov. L. REP.
16,202 (D. Neb., June 29, 1972) (temporary restraining order prohibiting repossession and sale of auto under §§ 9-503 and 9-504,
creditor ordered to return car to debtor, debtor to resume making payments weekly); Kipp
v. Cozens, 11 UCC REP. SERv. 1067 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 27, 1972) (upholding repossession
of auto, provisions of § 9-503 are not unconstitutional, and are no more than a codification
or restatement of the common law, and create no new rights, duties, obligations or remedies); Hadley v. Fisher, CCH 1972 Pov. L. RaP.
15,757 (Cal. Super. Ct., May 8, 1972)
(preliminary injunction prohibiting repossession and sale of auto under §§ 9-503 and 9504); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz, 11 UCC REP. SERv. 627 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Kings County,
Oct. 3, 1972) (creditor's action for deficiency judgment after repossession and sale of
debtor's auto under § 9-503, and presumably § 9-504, dismissed, repossession illegal under
9-503, due process requires "notice and hearing which are aimed at establishing the validity
or at least the probable validity of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before
he can be deprived of his property").
88 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972).
89 Id. at 673-74.
90 Id. at 674.
91 Id. The court cited the following cases as authority for its position: Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1972) (state suspended plaintiff's driver's license without a hearing); Boddie
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pursuant to section 9-503, was the act of a private individual and constituted at most merely "passive state action" which was not violative
of due process. The court made no reference to Adams nor to the Reitman interpretation in granting the bank's motion to dismiss, but noted
that section 9-503 was merely the codification of the common law,
which did not require the direct intervention of the state's power. 92
In Kirksey v. Theilig,9 3 plaintiffs relied primarily on Reitman in
contending that state authorization and encouragement of self-help was
sufficient state involvement for those private acts to meet federal jurisdictional requirements. In dismissing the action the court found Reitman distinguishable in two major respects. In Reitman, an amendment
to a state constitution had the effect of authorizing and encouraging
private acts of discrimination which had been expressly prohibited by
fair housing legislation.9 4 In contrast, the Kirksey court found in statutorily authorized self-help that "any kind of encouragement of the private acts by the state is nearly non-existent." 95 Secondly, the court concluded that the resolution of the state action question in Reitman was
tied to its involvement with racial discrimination. In such cases, the
Kirksey court reasoned, states had attempted to do indirectly, through
intentional circumvention of the constitution, acts which they were
prohibited from doing directly. Thus, courts were forced to look beyond the "form of the activity in order to find its tainted substance."9 ,
However, the court found that in self-help as authorized by the Code,
both form and substance are the same. Such statutory approval represents a legislative determination that this remedy is historically sound
and economically desirable for both debtor and creditor, and so may
not be regarded as an attempt on the part of the state to skirt constituv. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (state denied indigents access to its courts); Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (state statute authorized police chief to prevent
sales or gifts of liquor to plaintiff without a hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (welfare agency prohibited from terminating public assistance without prior hearing). See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
92 348 F. Supp. at 675.
93 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972).
94 See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
95 351 F. Supp. at 731.
We would be less than candid if we did not note that the private activity can
be interpreted as being encouraged by the statutes. But encouragement exists
only in the very limited sense that under the statutes the secured parties have
less risk in making the repossessions than they would if there were no statutes
or case law on the subject.
Id. at 731 n.8.
96 Id. at 732.
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tional requirements. 9 7 The mere statutory authorization of self-help repossession did not "sufficiently involve the state in the acts of defendants herein for their acts to constitute action 'under color of' state
law."98

Similarly, the Messenger court found that the codification of selfhelp repossession in section 9-503 was not sufficient to give that practice
the color of state law. While 9-503 limits a creditor's use of self-help to
peaceful situations, it does not create or substantially contribute to the
creation of the right of self-help. The court viewed the exercise of this
remedy as essentially one created by the terms of a private contractual
agreement, the Code merely recognizing that "where the parties have
agreed about possession after default their agreement is to control." 99
The Messenger court therefore rejected plaintiff's contention that
the right to repossess was created by section 9-503, or that the existence
of the statute was influential in the inclusion of the repossession provisions in the sales contract. The court referred to self-help's "ancient and
honorable" lineage as a common law remedy.10 0 However, as Fuentes
recognized, under modern practice such remedies as replevin bear little
resemblance to their ancestors.' 0' Common law recaption, the ancestor
to the modern form of self-help repossession, was a remedy for goods
that had been wrongfully detained. In fact, recaption as it originally
developed had other applications, and was also a self-help action to recover "possession" of one's wife and children wrongfully held by the
02
lord of the manor.
The imprimatur of the Code is evidenced by the draftsman's inId.
98 Id. at 733. While the Kirksey court found state action lacking, it rejected the
creditor's contention that the authority to repossess by self-help is derived solely as a
matter of contract.
Though it might be possible that the parties could agree to the same default
provisions without the existence of the U.C.C., at present it is obvious to us that
authority for the repossessions arises from both the agreements and the U.c.C....
Further, if the U.C.C. did not exist, it is not dear to us why the same "authorization" problems could not arise under the commdo law.
Id. at 731 n.7 (citations omitted).
99 121 N.J. Super. at 7, 295 A.2d at 405.
100 Id. at 8-9, 295 A.2d at 405-06.
101 407 U.S. at 78-80. See Note, Replevin-Prior Notice and Hearing--Due Process,
40 TENN. L. REv. 125, 126 nn.4-6, 127 (1972).
102 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 04:
Recaption or reprisal is another species of remedy by the mere act of the
party injured. This happens, when any one hath deprived another of his property
in goods or chattels personal, or wrongfully detains one's wife, child, or servant:
in which case the owner of the goods, and the husband, parent, or master, may
lawfully claim and retake them, wherever he happens to find them; so it be not
in a riotous manner, or attended with a breach of the peace.
97
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clusion of repossession provisions within the standard form contract
signed by Messenger:
Holder may retain the goods as its property or may sell or
otherwise dispose of same pursuant to the New Jersey Uniform
Commercial Code, whereupon Buyer shall be liable for and shall
pay any deficiency on demand. 10
In addition, the contract provided for interpretation "according to the
laws of the State of New Jersey" and stipulated that "all rights and
remedies are governed by such law." 10 4 The self-help remedy must be
coupled with other Article 9 provisions to permit sale of the seized collateral and entry of a deficiency judgment on the balance still owed
after resale. Self-help is thus a "vital, interdependent cog" of Article 9's
machinery, and as some writers have argued, must be considered "state
action" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, or under
"color of law" as required by federal jurisdictional statutes. 10 5
The Messenger court specifically rejected the Adams view that the
acts of a private individual pursuant to state law constitute state action,
and instead agreed with Oiler that such reliance on Reitman was misplaced, since Reitman was concerned solely with racial prejudice. 10 6
However, while the Messenger court correctly stated that due process
was not the immediate concern of Reitman, that case has been interpreted in other contexts as a significant extension of the state action
107
concept.
The court considered in the alternative the contention that selfhelp repossession amounted to a denial of due process, assuming argu103

Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 1, "Exhibit B."

104 Id.

105 Clark, supra note 23, at 329, 330 n. 116a.
106 121 N.J. Super. at 6-7, 295 A.2d at 405. The logic of this position has been
criticized in Comment, State Action and Waiver Implications of Self-Help Repossession,
25 ME. L. REV. 27, 32-33 (1973) (footnotes omitted):
The reasoning behind the Oiler court's refusal to apply Reitman is superficially
persuasive and, if the Oiler court is correct, much of the guidance the Supreme
Court has given on state action is of very limited applicability, since many of the
leading decisions concerning state action arose in the context of equal protection
and racial discrimination. However, there is a fundamental flaw in logic which
bases a determination of state action upon the character of the substantive issues
of the case. Whether a case involves state action is a threshold question which
should be answered affirmatively before any testts to determine violation of fourteenth amendment rights are introduced. It is, in effect, a jurisdictional question
to be considered prior to and separately from any substantive matters raised. The
character of the case is a factor which affects the stringency of the substantive test
applied, but it should not be injected into the preliminary examination of a
foundation for jurisdiction.
107 See, e.g., Note, State Constitutional Amendment GuaranteeingDiscretion to Seller
of Real Estate Violates Fourteenth Amendment, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1346, 1349 (1967).
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endo that section 9-503 gave that practice the color of state law. The
court regarded as significant the economic consequences of a requirement for prior notice and hearing before repossession, although the
Supreme Court in Fuentes had refused to consider these same costs in
its determination that replevin procedures were unconstitutional . 0
Fuentes expressly indicated that it was "clear that the avoidance of the
ordinary costs imposed by the opportunity for a hearing is not sufficient
' 09

to override the constitutionalright."'

The Messenger court referred to the bank's tolerant attitude towards the buyer's poor payment record as though this acted in mitigation of the absence of due process safeguards. 10 However, the Fuentes
Court has indicated that even assuming debtors are in default and have
no other valid defenses, such considerations are immaterial, since the
right to a prior hearing is not dependent on an advance showing of a
i
meritorious defense."
The Messenger court indicated that the Supreme Court's opinion
in Overmyer demonstrates flexibility in fashioning due process requirements to fit different situations. 12 In Overmyer, the Court held that a
judgment obtained on a cognovit note was not per se violative of due
process. However, there the note had been bargained for by businessmen and their attorneys, demonstrating the utility of summary provisions in a proper commercial setting. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, recognized that if the provisions had been included in a contract
of adhesion, where the debtor received nothing for the waiver, "other
legal consequences may ensue." 113 The Messenger court found the automobile sales contract to be one of adhesion, yet in referring to the setting of commercial equality presented in Overmyer, concluded in seeming contradiction that the manner in which the cognovit clause had
been negotiated "bears forcefully upon the type of case of which this
4
one is an example.""11
The court sought to distinguish Fuentes on the basis that the con108 121 N.J. Super. at 9-12, 295 A.2d at 406-08; see note 53 supra. The court agreed
with spokesmen for the credit community who had appeared as witnesses for the defense
in Messenger that the modification of the self-help procedure to include prior notice and
hearing "would impose substantial additional costs of doing business." 121 N.J. Super.
at 12, 295 A.2d at 407. Fuentes, however, recognized that the only right constitutionally
mandated before repossession was an opportunity to be heard, and that the aggregate
cost of such a hearing should not be exaggerated. 407 U.S. at 92 n.29.
109 407 U.S. at 92 n.29 (emphasis added).
110 121 N.J. Super. at 4, 12, 295 A.2d at 403, 408.
1M1 407 U.S. at 87.
112 121 N.J. Super. at 13-14, 295 A.2d at 408-09.
113 405 U.S. at 187-88.
14 121 N.J. Super. at 14, 295 A.2d at 409. See Neth, supra note 58, at 29-30.
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tractual language in that case had failed to waive notice of hearing,
while in the case under consideration the language clearly indicated a
waiver of that right. 115 However, after taking into account those considerations relevant to the determination of a contractual waiver of due
process rights outlined in Overmyer, the Fuentes Court rejected the
creditors' claims of waiver finding the purported waivers in the installment contracts too vague to be effective. 116 The Overmyer Court concluded that a confession of judgment clause, when negotiated by two
business corporations through arms'-length bargaining with the advice
of counsel, was a valid waiver of due process rights, "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly" made, with both parties aware of the significance of the waiver provision. 117 The Fuentes Court would require
that a waiver "in any context must, at the very least, be clear." 118 The
Messenger court chose to ignore the Supreme Court's acknowledgment
of the strong presumption against waiver of the right to prior notice
and hearing. Instead, Messenger would permit the waiver to be effective even in the absence of proof that the debtor was actually aware of
the provisions. The court found it "difficult to believe" that the buying
public was not aware of the likelihood of repossession following default. 119 However, while a waiver per se is not violative of due process,
the Supreme Court has indicated that in circumstances such as those
presented in Messenger, more than a vague, unarticulated awareness is
120
required to validate a waiver of constitutional rights.
The rapidly developing body of post-Sniadach cases concerning
prejudgment remedies has been one of confusion and conflict. Ambiguities concerning the application and requirements of due process
created by that decision were not satisfactorily resolved in Fuentes,
which gave those safeguards even further extension. Thus, it is not
surprising that the self-help cases have had difficulty in reaching a consensus over those problems in the context of automobile repossession.
Thus far, the decisions have found in the state action issue a means of
avoiding the weighty economic consequences that would appear to result from the imposition of safeguards mandated by Fuentes. Professor
Charles Black, in analyzing Reitman, recognized that "there were and
are no clear and concrete tests of state action; the concept is notoriously, scandalously lacking in these; it is itself nothing but a catch121 N.J. Super. at 15, 295 A.2d at 409.
U.S. at 95.
117 405 U.S. at 186-87.
118 407 U.S. at 95.
119 121 N.J. Super. at 15-16, 295 A.2d at 409-10.
120 See Comment, supra note 106, at 37-41.
115
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phrase."1 21 The state action arguments raised in Messenger and the
other self-help cases merit more than the facile analysis presented in
those decisions.12 The constitutional status of self-help repossession,
representing an issue of major importance to the credit community as
well as to consumer groups, will, in all probability, have to be ulti1 23
mately resolved by the Supreme Court.

Robert G. Rose
121 Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California'sProposition 14,
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 69, 88 (1967). For a helpful analysis of
§ 9-503 as state action, see Neth, supra note 58, at 56-62; Comment, supra note 106, at 3035.
122 The question has been raised whether the typical due process provisions found
in state constitutions require state action. Felsenfeld & Finkelson, supra note 13, at 44.
They argue that the rights protected by the N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6, and the CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § 13 require no state action. This being so, it is contended that if the federal courts
are closed to debtors over the jurisdictional issue, then the state courts will become the
likely testing grounds for further constitutional attack of self-help repossession.
Messenger argued that self-help was violative of the N.J. CONsT. art. 1,
1, as well as
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 121 N.J. Super. at 5, 295 A.2d
at 404. The New Jersey provision states:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
The Messenger court in concluding that self-help was not violative of the due process
clause, did not separately consider or make reference to the New Jersey provision. Id. at 17,
295 A.2d at 410-11.
Quaere: Are the rights enumerated in article 1,
1 of the New Jersey Constitution
protected only in instances in which a significant deprivation is threatened by an arm
of the state?
123 Various proposals for the legislative reform of repossession practices as well as
a review of various authoritative creditor-debtor viewpoints are described in S. Posel,
Limitations on Creditor's Remedies: Repossession and Deficiency Judgment, in Cuuazwrr
PROBLEMS IN TnE LAW OF CONSUMER CREnrr 1-39 (1971), an unpublished collection of
working papers prepared by Professor Posel of the Rutgers Law School for the New Jersey
Uniform Consumer Credit Code Study Commission.

